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Abstract
The interconnection of thousands of Autonomous Systems (ASs) makes up the Internet.
Each AS shares trade agreements with its neighbors that regulate the costs associated
with traffic exchanged on the physical links. These agreements are local, i.e., are settled
only between directly connected ASs, but have a global impact by influencing the paths
allowed for the routing of network packets and the costs associated with these routes.
Indeed, the costs and earnings of interconnected ASs is function of many factors, such
as size of the ASs, existing agreements, routing policy, traffic pattern and AS-level
topology. In this paper we present an approach that takes these factors into account to
assess peering and transit agreements. Here we focus on traffic generated from P2P
activities, but the approach is general enough to be applied to different traffic classes.
The P2P model we present is based on the use of the generating function, it allows to
perform an analytical study of the traffic associated to file-sharing. The proposed P2P
model is able to consider large number of peers sharing several resources, spread along
different ASs connected through a series of links. We validate the results of our P2P
model against one of the most widely used P2P simulator, i.e. PeerSim. Using both the
AS-level and P2P model we evaluate how the inter-AS P2P traffic influences the AS
network cost and earning.
Keywords: Peer-to-peer Networks, Autonomous Systems, Generating Function
1. Introduction
Studying the relationships between “Autonomous Systems” (ASs) has become an
important research issue. Indeed, Internet traffic is generated from applications that
are agnostic of the underlying AS topology. This leads to poor usage of network’s
resources, resulting in an economic damage for ASs. The latter must be studied under
realistic traffic assumptions, considering common applications, such as peer-to-peer,
Internet 2.0 and social networks.
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In particular, peer-to-peer (P2P) applications generate huge data flows that nowa-
days is a major fraction of the Internet traffic [33]. P2P systems can be used in differ-
ent contexts, such as file sharing (Gnutella [37], KaZaa [38], eDonkey [28], BitTorrent
[29]), telephony applications (Skype [39]), and content delivery infrastructures (see
[16]). File-sharing is one of the most popular where contents such as multimedia and
software are spread over the network. The size of resources ranges from several kilo-
bytes up to some gigabytes. In order to understand the dynamics of such applications,
it is interesting to study how shared resources move across the network. Despite the
large number of parameters involved, P2P file sharing applications might have different
impact on the overall network performance depending on their setting. For instance,
a P2P client could be encouraged to seek required contents in peers belonging to the
same AS in order to reduce the traffic in the network.
This work exploits the results presented in [22] to study the impact of the com-
mercial relationship among different autonomous systems on the costs of supporting
P2P traffic. In particular, in this paper we study the diffusion of a resource in a non-
homogeneous environment. Peers are considered being spread among the ASs, each
one having its own parameters in terms of resource availability and demand. We pro-
pose a probabilistic model that describes the diffusion of a resource taking into account
(non-homogeneous) resource popularity and peers behavior. The model is extended to
also consider multi-resource scenario where each peer can hold more resource types.
The main goal of this paper is to provide the system administrator the tools to min-
imize its cost related to the traffic produced by the users of its network. In particular,
we want to show how this can be achieved by either trying to settle different peering
agreements with other ASs, or by applying intelligent routing schemes that can provide
a cheaper use of its resources. Our contribution is twofold: first we present a method-
ology to account for cost and rewards in complex AS topologies under a given traffic
pattern, then we propose an analytical procedure to describe such a pattern in the case
of P2P file sharing networks.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief discussion on some
related work (Section 2), we describe how we modeled topology and relationships be-
tween ASs (Section 3). The resources diffusion in a P2P overlay network is considered
in Sections 4, 5, 6. We validate the proposed model by simulation in Section 7. Finally,
we apply the proposed technique in a complex scenario (Section 8).
2. Background and Related Work
In this section, we briefly describe the Internet’s AS-level, explaining peering and
transit agreements between ASs and inter-AS routing protocols. We describe previous
attempts in literature to model or optimize AS relationships and routing. We introduce
the P2P paradigm and review some of the existing resource diffusion models.
2.1. The Internet AS-level
The term Autonomous System informally identifies a set of routers under the same
technical administration, that share common metrics to route packets within the AS,
while use an inter-AS protocol for forward network messages to other. An AS appears
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to its neighbors having a single coherent internal routing plan, announcing routes that
are reachable through it.
A more rigorous definition is given in RFC 1930 [10] that defines an AS as a group
of IP prefixes that share a unique and clearly defined routing policy. Here ”prefix”
is referred to a CIDR block, a group of one or more classful networks (A, B or C
networks).
In Internet each AS is uniquely identified by an Autonomous System Number
(ASN), a 32 bit integer as specified in RFC 4893 [35]. ASN are assigned by the Inter-
net Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to Regional Internet Registry (RIRS). RIRSs
are responsible for specific geographic areas and in turn assign ASNs to organizations
that make request.
The protocol used nowadays to exchange routing and reachability information is
the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [25, 26, 34, 4]. The current version is BGP-
4. BGP-4 is defined as an exterior gateway protocol used for intra-AS routing, in
contrast to the interior gateway protocols, like Routing Information Protocol (RIP) [11]
or Intermediate System To Intermediate System (IS-IS) [24]), used within the same
AS. Each AS runs some BGP-4 gateways that discover routes exchanging reachability
information with other gateway. Each one announces the destinations (i.e other ASs ),
that are reachable through it.
BGP is a Path Vector Protocol, so gateways exchange full AS-paths, according
to their routing policies. These determine what are the best paths to reach a specific
destination. A common parameter is the length of AS-path [31], preferring shorter over
longer ones, but the AS administration can specify more complex policies.
2.2. Traffic agreements: peering and transit
According to the BGP Topological Model (cf. RFC 1655 [31], Section 2), a di-
rect connection between two AS is both a physical connection (i.e., a shared network
formed at least from one border gateway for each AS) and a BGP session running on
the border routers (gateways). A connection is demanding in terms of economical re-
sources (hardware, maintenance, technical administration), so commercial agreements
are settled between directly connected ASs. An AS could be connected to more ASs
and have a specific agreement with each one. In this case the AS is called multihomed.
Otherwise, a stub is an AS that is connected to only one AS.
Among the existing established methods to exchange Internet traffic between di-
rectly connected networks, the most used are peering and transit. In peering two
networks do not charge any fees to each other, while a transit agreement occurs when
an AS pays to another some fees to reach other parts of Internet. In this case the traffic
travels across the seller AS and is forwarded to the next hop to destination.
Peering and transit agreements can influence the way messages are routed on the
AS topology because BGP policies used from a network are based on economical and
commercial considerations [26]. Indeed, is convenient for an AS to announce routes
for other networks it peers only to its customers. Usually traffic between two peering
partners is not forwarded. In the same way it is not allowed to route traffic from peering
partners to seller ASs and vice-versa. The reasons behind these policies are simple to
understand: if an AS announces these kind of routes, it would be providing free transit
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over its network for its peers or buy transit from another network and giving it away
freely to a peer. For sake of clarity we illustrate some allowed paths for the topology
depicted in Figure 2:
 AS8 can see all the networks because networks AS5, AS6, AS7 buy transit from
it.
 AS1 can see AS2 and its customers directly, but not AS3 through network AS2.
 Traffic from AS4 to AS7 is routed by AS6, but not through AS5.
 AS4 can see Network B through its peer AS5, but not via its transit customer
AS2.
Peering and transit agreements also induce a hierarchy on AS topology. At the top
there are Tier 1 networks (AS8 in the example in Figure 2), that sell transit traffic
to all its partners and can reach every other AS without pay any settlements or buy
transit traffic. A Tier 2 network (the other ASs in Figure 2) buys transit traffic but has
also some peering agreements. Finally, the term Tier 3 is sometimes used to refer to
networks that only purchase transit traffic.
2.3. Modeling and improving intra-AS routing
Many research works have investigated the interaction between p2p protocols and
ASs or Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Often the proposed techniques aim to min-
imize the inter-domain traffic while maintaining an acceptable quality of service. On
the other side, few research efforts has been directed towards the modeling of the com-
plex network of commercial relationships between ASs. Model the AS-level is crucial
in order to understand how the network-aware techniques and application protocols
influence costs and rewards of ASs.
Indeed, practically there is always a tradeoff between network awareness and pro-
tocol performance. Some authors argue [27] [42] that AS-aware techniques lead to per-
formance degradation in many practical conditions. In [27] a measuring study demon-
strates as a BitTorrent client in practice has few peers in its neighborhood that belong
to the same AS, so using a locality-based approach has a too high impact on protocol
performance.
Exploiting locality is one of the most diffused strategies for cost minimization.
Several proposals that use this approach are summarized in [6]. The key point is to
identify the p2p traffic, via the ports it uses or packets inspection, and redirect to the
same network or throttle the bandwidth of the heaviest users. Redirection often requires
the implementation of tracker oracles that select neighbor peers from the same AS
as proposed in [1], [40], [5] and [17]. The work presented in [17] proposes an ISP-
friendly protocol to control the cross-ISP traffic for reducing congestion and operating
costs. This protocol is based on the idea that a peer downloads resources first among
the peers belonging to the same AS, such as the policy presented in our work in Section
5.2. First authors develop a mathematical model to support the efficiency of the idea.
Then they implement it on BitTorrent clients in order to evaluate via experiments the
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cross-ISP traffic reduction and, moreover, the average file downloading time. Although
our model does not consider time issues, this limit can be easily relaxed by associating
time/bandwith costs to resource transfers. The ISP-friendly protocol is implemented at
application level with clients exploiting information provided by their ISP, whereas in
our work the searching policies should be performed at AS level. We think that ASs
can plan their searching policies analyzing the traffic and cost evaluation derived by
our generating function based model.
Exploring the effectiveness of network-aware techniques requires a model that
takes into account commercial relationships between ASs, e.g., peering and transit
agreements. For example, it could be interesting to explore the consequences of an
egoistic AS that reroutes all the p2p traffic towards its customer instead of its provider
links. Many works in literature related to the AS-topology investigate the AS-graph
formation and evolution [36] [18] [9]. These works start from economic principles and
try to capture the salient features of the provider and customer selection process explor-
ing the AS network grow. All these topology evolution models are useful to understand
properties of the graph, but don’t describe the interaction between this latter and the
application level protocols.
In [42] a model for three of the common used strategies for network awareness is
proposed. The main limitation of this work is that it is useful only for the described
strategies, and it is not clear what is the effort to generalize for more generic ones. The
work presented in [6] explores the possibility to optimize the path trading technique
between several ASs. When use path trading an AS defers from using hot potato rout-
ing and in turn it expects its neighbors do the same. In [42] is shown that the path
trading optimization problem is NP-hard, but the authors propose a pseudo polynomial
algorithm based on some heuristics. In [19] is presented a more detailed and realis-
tic network model with three classes of ISPs: content, transit, and eye- ball, but only
simple scenarios are explored. In [2] an analysis of peering and transit agreements is
proposed. The study aims to provide guidelines for solving disputes between ISPs and
for establishing regulatory protocols, but also in this case it is limited only to two ISPs.
The main limitation of the previously cited models is that none of them explores
the interaction between ASs and application layer protocols. Moreover, these models
are often limited to simple scenarios or to a fixed number of strategies. In this work we
propose a model for the AS-level that takes into account peering and transit agreements,
complex network and is able to compute AS cost and reward distributions.
2.4. P2P models
For what concerns traffic modeling, and in particular P2P systems, there are several
works related with our proposal. The work presented in [30] shows a fluid model
for the BitTorrent P2P application, and it is able to study steady-state performance
measures, such as the number of peers that have a resource and remain in the system
to allow its diffusion. In our work we consider the transient behavior instead, by using
an embedded process where time is not considered explicitly.
The simulation techniques proposed in [13] investigate the diffusion of a file in a
e-Donkey system, as a function of several parameters such as sharing probability and
requests arrival rate. The analytical model developed in [15] is based on biological epi-
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demics. In particular, it is used to predict the diffusion of single files in a P2P network,
whereas we focus on the diffusion of single or distinct resources among different ASs.
The probabilistic model presented in [23] is inspired by the study of file swarming
in BitTorrent like systems. The measurement-based technique utilized in [32] provides
static, topological, and dynamic analysis of the P2P Gnutella environment. The dy-
namic analysis allows to study the variations in terms of popularity of individual files,
and in terms of the number of available files at individual peers. We also compute the
resource diffusion, but we focus on the traffic among ASs.
One of the models studied in [41] considers how a document is spread to the re-
questing peers into a bit-torrent environment. The model proposed in [3] describes P2P
dynamics through a set of second order fluid equations, that allows to derive results re-
lated to the resource distribution among peers. The models developed in [7, 21] are
aimed at studying the transfer time distribution of a resource: their goal is to character-
ize the time required to diffuse a resource from a set of peers holding it. In this paper
we do not focus on the transfer time of a single resource, but we consider the whole
traffic produced by all the transfers.
In this paper we mainly adopt the model proposed in [22], since it natively support
the subdivision of peers among different ASs that will be detailed in Section 4.
3. Modeling Autonomous Systems
We are interested in studying the costs that must be sustained and the gains that
can be achieved from the agreements set among the ASs. In particular, starting from a
formal description of the network topology, we want to be able to estimate gains and
costs for each AS induced by a particular traffic scenario.
3.1. AS topology
We consider a network composed byN ASs. We use a traffic matrixX to represent
the data flows between the ASs:
X =
264 x11 : : : x1N... xij ...
xN1 : : : xNN
375 : (1)
Each element xij represents the amount of traffic exchanged on the logical link
between the AS i and the AS j. A logical link between i and j is a BGP session over
a physical connection between two gateways. The physical connection might spread
over several physical links. The network topology is described by a graph G:
G = (V;Ep; Et; ): (2)
Element V = fAS1; : : : ; ASNg contains the vertexes of the graph that corresponds
to the N ASs, i.e., the list of AS identifiers. As already mentioned in Section 2 we
consider two type of agreements, pure peering and transit. Two ASs connected with
a peering link do not charge any fee each other to communicate over that channel,
whereas in a transit agreement the customer node i pays to the seller node j instead. To
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take this issue into account, edges of the graph are defined as ordered pairs and grouped
in two disjoint sets Ep and Et. For each peering agreement between ASs i and j, both
the pairs (i, j) and (j, i) are inserted in Ep, while a transit agreement is represented
from the pair (i, j) in Et, where i is the AS id of the customer and j the seller’s one.
Despite agreements are confidential, it is a reasonable assumption that cost is pro-
portional to the traffic carried on links. These costs are computed using the relations
 : (N  N) ! R. It associates to an ordered pair (i, j) the fee payed from ASi for a
traffic unit carried on the link from ASi to ASj . The relation returns this cost if there
is a transit agreement between ASi and ASj with the first as customer, 0 otherwise.
3.2. Cost and reward matrices
Using the G representation of the AS network we build a Cost Matrix Ck and a
Reward MatrixRk for each AS. A value ckij 6= 0 means that the ASk is involved in the
communication between i and j, and ckij is the cost it pays for a traffic unit that travels
from ASi to ASj . In the same way the Reward Matrix Rk defines how much ASk
gains when two other ASs communicate.
Algorithm 3.1 describes the function BuildCostRewardsMatrices() that computes
Ck and Rk from the network description G. In Algorithm 3.1 line (i) is used the
function DijkstraModified() (Algorithm 3.2) to find the shortest path between any pair
of ASs. This function is a modified version of the Dijkstra algorithm that computes the
shortest path among all sources considering transit and peering agreements to eliminate
not allowed routes (see Section 2.2).
The purpose of Algorithm 3.2 is to build the predecessor matrix P . The element
P(i,j) of this matrix stores the predecessor of the ASj on the shortest route to it from
ASi. The function repeats the classical single-source Dijkstra algorithm for all vertices
using the AllowedNeighbors() (Algorithm 3.2 line (i)) to restrict the neighborhood to
the nodes that are on allowed paths. We have used the notation Dist(i; j) to denote
the distance to be used in the minimum path algorithm. In our application we have
simply set Dist(i; j) = 1 if ASi and ASj are directly connected. Algorithm 3.3 takes
into account that an AS does not announce routes between peering partners, between
peering ASs and transit seller or between two seller nodes (Algorithm 3.3 line (ii)). It
will announce routes for all its neighbors to its customers nodes (Algorithm 3.3 line
(i)) instead.
Once computed all the shortest allowed routes (Algorithm 3.1 line (i)), the matrices
Ck and Rk are built using the predecessor matrix P to retrieve the path among each
pair of ASs. If between two nodes that are on the route from ASi to ASj there is a
transit agreement, the fees computed using the  relation are stored in the Ckij element
of the customer ASk and in the Rsij reward matrix of the seller ASs (Algorithm 3.1
lines (ii) and (iii)).
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Algorithm 3.1: BUILDCOSTREWARDMATRICES(V;Ep; Et; )
P  DijkstraModified(V;Ep; Et) (i)
for each (i; j) 2 (V  V ); i 6= j
do
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
k  j
while P (i; k) 6= NULL
do
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
p P (i; k)
if (p; k) 2 Et
do

Rkij = (p; k); C
p
ij = (p; k) (ii)
if (k; p) 2 Et
do

Ckij = (k; p); R
p
ij = (k; p) (iii)
k  p
Algorithm 3.2: DIJKSTRAMODIFIED(V;Ep; Et; )
D(i; i) 0;8i 2 V
D(i; j) 1;8(i; j) 2 V  V; i 6= j
P (i; j) NULL;8(i; j) 2 V  V
for each i 2 V
do
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Q V
u argminfD(i; j) : j 2 Qg
while (Q 6= ;) ^ (D(i; u) <1)
do
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Q Q n fug
S  Q \AllowNeighbors(Ep; Et; P (i; u); u) (i)
D(i; j) minfD(i; j); D(i; u)+
Dist(u; j)g; j 2 S
P (i; j) argminfD(i; p) +Dist(p; j)g :
p 2 fP (i; j); ug; j 2 S
return (P )
Algorithm 3.3: ALLOWNEIGHBORS(Ep; Et; p; u)
if (p  NULL) _ ((p; u) 2 Et)
do neighbors fj : (u; j) 2 (Ep [ Et)g [ fj : (j; u) 2 (Ep [Et)g (i)
else
do neighbors fj : (j; u) 2 Et)g (ii)
return (neighbors)
For sake of clarity, here we report an example related to the network illustrated in
Figure 1. The topology is made of six ASs connected with six links. There are some
routes that are not allowed, e.g., AS1
L1! AS2 L4! AS3 because AS2 does not announce
routes between its peering partners. Note that the connection between AS3 and AS4
is possible since AS2 gains on the link L3. As consequence of these forbidden paths,
AS3 results connected only to AS1, AS2 and AS4, but not with AS5 and AS6. AS2
case is particularly interesting in this network because it is directly connected to all
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Table 1: Routes from AS1 to others that involve AS2
Route12 : AS1
L1! AS2
Route13 : AS1
L2! AS4 L3! AS2 L4! AS3
Route15 : AS1
L2! AS4 L3! AS2 L5! AS5
Route16 : AS1
L2! AS4 L3! AS2 L6! AS6
ASs and involved in all communications that originate from i 2 fAS1; AS2; AS3g and
ends in j 2 fAS5; AS6g. Therefore all routes that involveAS2 and a transit agreement
influence its cost and reward matrices. In Table 1 we enumerate all the routes fromAS1
to others that involve AS2. When AS1 sends a packet to AS6, it follows the Route16,
so AS2 gains a quantity (4; 2) from AS4 for the usage of the link L3 but pays (2; 6)
to AS6 for the traffic that travels on L6. In Figure 1 we report the C2 and R2 matrices
computed for the AS2.
Once computed the Ck and Rk matrices for each AS, it is simple to retrieve the
total cost Ck sustained and the total reward Rk for ASk simply using:
Ck = ~1  (X  Ck) ~10 and Rk = ~1  (X Rk) ~10
where  defines the entry wise product between matrices and  is the standard row-
by-column matrix product.
4. P2P resource diffusion
In this section we describe the probabilistic model of the P2P traffic traveling
among the considered ASs. We first define the peer-to-peer scenario (Section 4.1),
then we provide the analytical representation of peers (Section 4.2). Finally, we study
the evolution of the system in order to characterize the resource diffusion (Section 4.3).
4.1. Network scenario
We consider that peers are distributed across N different ASs, and we assume that
the total number of peers in the system is a discrete random variable that follows a
given probability distribution p(m). We express this distribution with its generating
function G(z):
G(z) =
1X
m=0
p(m)zm (3)
We only take into account peers that can participate in the diffusion, i.e., peers that
either hold or request the resource. We denote by si the probability that a peer is in
the i-th AS. In each AS peers are divided into three different classes: a) peers holding
the resource and available for sharing it, b) peers requiring the resource, and c) peers
holding the resource, but not sharing it, i.e., freeloaders [8]. The class of each peer is
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Table 2: Model Notations
Notation Description
N Number of Autonomous Systems (AS)
si Probability that a peer belongs to the i-th AS
G(z) Generating function of the distribution of the number of peers in the network
i Probability that a peer in the i-th AS holds the resource
i Probability that a peer in the i-th AS wants the resource
i Probability that a peer in the i-th AS holds the resource but does not share it
i Probability that a peer in the i-th AS does not share the resource after getting it
ni Number of peers holding the resource in the i-th AS
pi Number of peers requiring the resource in the i-th AS
qi Number of peers holding the resource but not sharing it in the i-th AS
ui Generating function of the number of peers holding the resource in the i-th AS
vi Generating function of the number of peers requiring the resource in the i-th AS
wi Generating function of the number of peers holding but not sharing it in the i-th AS
ij Cost (Fee) payed by ASi for a traffic unit carried on the link from ASi to ASj
i Resource splitting factor between owned and searched in the i-th AS
Ck Cost matrix for ASk
ckij The cost for ASk when ASi and ASj communicate
Rk Reward matrix for ASk
rkij The reward for ASk when ASi and ASj communicate
wgtij The weight assigned by ASi to ASj for the Weighted Policy
determined randomly, according to a given initial probability: i for class a), i for
class b) and i for class c) (with i + i + i = 1). Not that i has no impact on the
system behavior, but it is of interest since it allows us to investigate of the number of
freeloaders. The number of peers of the three classes are respectively denoted by ni,
pi and qi. We denote by i the probability that a peer that gets the resource decides to
not share it. Peers requiring the resource can either get it from peers lying in the the
same AS or from peers belonging to others ASs. All model notations are summarized
in Table 2.
4.2. The model
We represent the P2P system by introducing the distribution of the number of peers
and its corresponding generating function.
We call (n1:::nN ; p1:::pN ; q1:::qN ) the joint distribution of the number of peers
in each class, for each of the N ASs. The generating function g() of this distribution
can be computed from parameters G(z), si, i, i and i as:
g(u1:::uN ; v1:::vN ; w1:::wN ) = G
 NX
i=1
si
h
iui + ivi + iwi
i
: (4)
An intuitive interpretation of Equation (4), is that each peer randomly chooses both
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its AS and its class with probability sii, sii or sii, which corresponds to z =PN
i=1 si
h
iui + ivi + iwi
i
.
The marginal distribution corresponding to the i-th AS is defined as:
i(ni; pi; qi) =
X
n1:::ni 1; ni+1:::nN ;
p1:::pi 1; pi+1:::pN ;
q1:::qi 1; qi+1:::qN
(n1:::nN ; p1:::pN ; q1:::qN ) (5)
We call gi(ui; vi; wi) the generating function ofi(ni; pi; qi). Using the properties
of the generating function and (4), we have that:
gi(ui; vi; wi) = g(1:::1; ui; 1:::1; 1:::1; vi; 1:::1; 1:::1; wi; 1:::1) =
= G

si
h
iui + ivi + iwi
i
+ 1  si
 (6)
where we set to 1 all the transformed variables except the ones corresponding to the
i-th AS.
We can compute the probability that a peer in the i-th AS holds the resource, given
that the AS is not empty (by empty we mean that there are no peers that can participate
in the resource diffusion as mentioned in Section 4.1) as:
i =
X
ni+pi+qi 6=0
ni
ni + pi + qi
i(ni; pi; qi): (7)
It can be shown that i can be computed in the following way:
i =
Z 1
0
h@gi(ui; vi; wi)
@ui
i
ui=y;vi=y;wi=y
dy: (8)
}Proof: We can show that we can obtain (7) from (8) by solving step by step the
right term of the equation. Starting from explicit form of 5 we have:
gi(ui; vi; wi) =
X
ni;pi;qi
unii v
pi
i w
qi
i i(ni; pi; qi)
@gi(ui; vi; wi)
@ui
=
X
ni;pi;qi
niu
ni 1
i v
pi
i w
qi
i i(ni; pi; qi)
h@gi(ui; vi; wi)
@ui
i
ui=y;vi=y;wi=y
=X
ni;pi;qi
niy
ni+pi+qi 1i(ni; pi; qi)
Z h@gi(ui; vi; wi)
@ui
i
ui=y;vi=y;wi=y
dy =X
ni;pi;qi
ni
ni + pi + qi
yni+pi+qii(ni; pi; qi) + c
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Equation (8) is proven by computing the integral between 0 and 1.}
If we calculate (8) with the definition (6) we get:
i = i(1  gi(0; 0; 0)) (9)
Hence we can write:
i =
i
(1  gi(0; 0; 0)) =
i
(1  G(1  si)) (10)
The term 1 G(1 si) corresponds to the probability that the i-th AS is not empty.
The same computation can be made for  and :
i =
i
(1  gi(0; 0; 0)) ;
i=
Z 1
0
h@gi(ui; vi; wi)
@vi
i
ui = y
vi = y
wi = y
dy (11)
i =
i
(1  gi(0; 0; 0)) ; i=
Z 1
0
h@gi(ui; vi; wi)
@wi
i
ui = y
vi = y
wi = y
dy (12)
4.3. System dynamics
We now study the evolution of parameters i, i and i, and show how they char-
acterize the resource diffusion in the system. In particular, we model the resource
diffusion among the ASs with an embedded time process: time is not considered ex-
plicitly, instead is modeled by a discrete variablem that increases of one unit whenever
a resource transfer is completed. With this assumption we compute mi , 
m
i and 
m
i ,
that correspond to the values of parameters i, i and i at timem.
Parameters  and  vary only due to a resource transfer. For sake of simplicity,
in this paper we neglect peers that give up requesting the resource and peers that quit
sharing it. However these assumptions could be easily removed by adding new param-
eters and different equations on  and . We expect that as time tends to the infinity,
every requests will be satisfied, that is (for any i-th AS):
lim
m!1
m
i = 
0
i + (1  i)0i (13)
lim
m!1
m
i = 0 (14)
lim
m!1 
m
i = 
0
i + i
0
i (15)
where 0i , 
0
i and 
0
i represent the initial system parameters.We are interested in study-
ing the evolution of mi , 
m
i and 
m
i until all transfers are completed. Note that changes
in these parameters affect the joint distribution of the number of peers per class, i.e.
m(n1::nN ; p1::pN ; q1::qN ).
We can define m+1i as function of the system parameters at timem:
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m+1i =
X
(
P
k pk = 0_P
k nk = 0)
ni + pi + qi 6= 0
ni
ni + pi + qi
m(n1::nN ; p1::pN ; q1::qN ) +
+
X
(
P
k pk 6= 0^P
k nk 6= 0)
ni + pi + qi 6= 0

ni + 1
ni + pi + qi
piP
k pk
(1  i) +
+
ni
ni + pi + qi

1  piP
k pk
(1  i)


 m(n1::nN ; p1::pN ; q1::qN )
(16)
The first addendum on the r.h.s. accounts for the case in which no transfer occurs
since either all requests in the system have been satisfied and there are no more peers
requiring the resource (
P
k pk = 0), or there are no resources in the system (
P
k nk =
0). The second addendum on the r.h.s. considers the case where a resource is actually
transferred. If the destination of the transfer is the i-th AS and the considered peer is
not a freeloader (with probability piP
k pk
(1 i)), then ni is increased by one (first term
in square brackets), otherwise ni remains constant (second term in square brackets).
By developing (16) we obtain:
m+1i =
X
ni+pi+qi 6=0
ni
ni + pi + qi
m(n1::nN ; p1::pN ; q1::qN ) +
+
X
(
P
k pk 6= 0^P
k nk 6= 0)
ni + pi + qi 6= 0
1
ni + pi + qi
piP
k pk
:
: m(n1::nN ; p1::pN ; q1::qN )(1  i) (17)
From (7) we can write:
m+1i = 
m
i +
m
i (1  i) (18)
where we define
mi =
X
(
P
k pk 6= 0^P
k nk 6= 0)
ni + pi + qi 6= 0
1
ni + pi + qi
piP
k pk
m(n1::nN ; p1::pN ; q1::qN )
=
X
P
k pk 6= 0
ni + pi + qi 6= 0
1
ni + pi + qi
piP
k pk
m(n1::nN ; p1::pN ; q1::qN )
 
X
P
k pk 6= 0
ni + pi + qi 6= 0
1
pi + qi
piP
k pk
m(0::0; p1::pN ; q1::qN ): (19)
13
mi (1   i) represents the variation of i at time m. In the same way the evolution
of i and i can be calculated as:
m+1i =
mi  mi (20)
m+1i = 
m
i +
m
i i (21)
mi can be computed exploiting the generating function representation of the num-
ber of peers in the system. We define pi =
X
k 6=i
pk and we denote with vi its corre-
sponding transformed variable. It can be shown that:
mi =
Z 1
0
24Z 1
0

@
@vi
g^i(ui; vi; wi; vi)

vi = xy
vi = x
dx
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ui = y
wi = y
dy: (22)
where
g^i(ui; vi; wi; vi) = g(1:::1; ui; 1:::1; vi:::vi; vi; vi:::vi; 1:::1; wi; 1:::1) 
g(0:::0; vi:::vi; vi; vi:::vi; 1:::1; wi; 1:::1) =
= G

1 + si
h
i(ui   1) + i(vi   vi) + i(wi   1)
i
+B(vi   1)

 
G

1 A+ si
h
i(vi   vi) + i(wi   1)
i
+B(vi   1)
 (23)
and A =
P
k skk and B =
P
k skk.
}Proof: By definition of generating function we have:
g^i(ui; vi; wi; vi) =
X
ni;pi;qi;pi
u
ni
i v
pi
i w
qi
i v
pi
i ^i(ni; pi; qi; pi) (24)
Elaborating (23) we obtain:
g(1:::1; ui; 1:::1; vi:::vi; vi; vi:::vi; 1:::1; wi; 1:::1) 
g(0:::0; vi:::vi; vi; vi:::vi; 1:::1; wi; 1:::1) =X
ni;pi;qi;pi
X
n1:::ni 1; ni+1:::nN ;
p1:::pi 1; pi+1:::pN^P
k Pk = pi;
q1:::qi 1; qi+1:::qN
m(n1::nN ; p1::pN ; q1::qN )u
ni
i v
pi
i w
qi
i v
pi
i  
X
pi;qi;pi
X
p1:::pi 1; pi+1:::pN^P
k Pk = pi;
q1:::qi 1; qi+1:::qN
m(0::0; p1::pN ; q1::qN )v
pi
i w
qi
i v
pi
i
(25)
Comparing (25) with (24) we have:
^i =
X
n1:::ni 1; ni+1:::nN ;
p1:::pi 1; pi+1:::pN ^
P
k Pk = pi;
q1:::qi 1; qi+1:::qN
m(n1::nN ; p1::pN ; q1::qN )  (26)
X
p1:::pi 1; pi+1:::pN ^
P
k Pk = pi;
q1:::qi 1; qi+1:::qN
m(0::0; p1::pN ; q1::qN )
By using a technique similar to the one used in the proof of (8) we can compute from (22):
@g^i
@vi
=
X
ni;pi;qi;pi
piu
ni
i v
pi 1
i w
qi
i v
pi
i ^i(ni; pi; qi; pi)
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h@g^i(ui; vi; wi; vi)
@vi
i
vi = xy
vi = x
=
X
ni;pi;qi;pi
piu
ni
i (xy)
pi 1wqii x
pi ^i(ni; pi; qi; pi) =
X
ni;pi;qi;pi
piu
ni
i x
pi+pi 1wqii y
pi 1^i(ni; pi; qi; pi)
Z h@g^i(ui; vi; wi; vi)
@vi
i
vi = xy
vi = x
dx =
X
ni;pi;qi;pi
pi
pi + pi
xpi+piu
ni
i w
qi
i y
pi 1^i(ni; pi; qi; pi) + c
Z 1
0
h@g^i(ui; vi; wi; vi)
@vi
i
vi = xy
vi = x
dx =
X
ni;qi;pi+pi 6=0
pi
pi + pi
u
ni
i w
qi
i y
pi 1^i(ni; pi; qi; pi)
"Z 1
0
h@g^i(ui; vi; wi; vi)
@vi
i
vi = xy
vi = x
dx
#
ui = y
wi = y
=
X
ni;qi;pi+pi 6=0
pi
pi + pi
yni+pi+qi 1^i(ni; pi; qi; pi)
Z "Z 1
0
h@g^i(ui; vi; wi; vi)
@vi
i
vi = xy
vi = x
dx
#
ui = y
wi = y
dy =
X
ni;qi;pi+pi 6=0
pi
pi + pi
1
ni + pi + qi
yni+pi+qi ^i(ni; pi; qi; pi) + c
Z 1
0
"Z 1
0
h@g^i(ui; vi; wi; vi)
@vi
i
vi = xy
vi = x
dx
#
ui = y
wi = y
dy = (27)
X
ni+pi+qi 6=0;pi+pi 6=0
pi
pi + pi
1
ni + pi + qi
^i(ni; pi; qi; pi)
If we insert (26) into (27) we obtain (22).}
By calculating (22) with (23) we obtain:
mi =
Z 1
0
sii
sii(y   1) +B

G (1 + si(y   1)) 
G (1 B + si(1  i)(y   1)) 
G (1 A+ si(1  i)(y   1)) +
G (1 A B + sii(y   1))

dy: (28)
Finally, from (18), (20), (21) and (28) we are able to compute mi ; 
m
i ; 
m
i for any step
m and for each AS i. Given the initial parameters 0i , 
0
i and 
0
i we have, by applying
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(10), (11) and (12), that:
mi =
mi
(1  G(1  si)) (29)
mi =
mi
(1  G(1  si)) (30)
mi = 1  (mi + mi ) (31)
5. Traffic among Autonomous Systems
The goal is to compute the traffic related to the resource across the N ASs by
considering three different search policies: uniform, internal first and weighted search.
5.1. Uniform search
We define Xji as the probability that there is a resource transfer from the AS j to
the AS i as reported in Table 3, row A. Note that conditions that allows a resource
transfer from AS j to i are nj 6= 0 and pi 6= 0. Since nj and pi are both to the numer-
ator, it is equivalent to use
PN
k=1 nk 6= 0 and
PN
k=1 pk 6= 0.
Using techniques similar to the proof of Equation (8) we can obtain the results shown
in Table 4, row A.
By calculating Equation reported in Table 4 row A with Equation (4) we obtain the ex-
pression indicated in row A of Table 5. Note that
P
i;j Xji is equal to the probability
that there is at least one peer holding the resource and one peer requiring it in the whole
system.
5.2. Internal search first
Let suppose the AS searches resources first among its peers and if it is not present
it will search in the others ASs. Then the definition of X can be split in the following
two cases as illustrated in Table 3, row B1 to consider the internal search first and row
B2 to describe the external search. By using the generating function we can write these
equations as shown in Table 4 rows B1 and B2.
The derivations of the previous equations can be easily obtained using a technique
similar to the one used to prove Equation (8), we have omitted for brevity.
Finally, by calculating equations indicated in Table 4 rows B1 and B2 with Equation
(4) we obtain the expression shown in row B of Table 5.
5.3. Weighted search
Each peer in AS i seeks the needed resources with higher probability in the AS k
with higher weight wgtik. The weight assigned by an AS to itself and to others can
be set according to different criteria. For instance, an AS could prefer shorter paths
to longer ones when communicating with other ASs. These expression are reported in
rows C of Tables 3, 4 and 5.
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Table 3: Different policies: initial expressions
A Xji =
P
n1:::nN ; p1:::pN ; q1:::qN :PN
k=1 nk 6= 0;
PN
k=1 pk 6= 0
njPN
k=1 nk
piPN
k=1 pk
(n1:::nN ; p1:::pN ; q1:::qN ):
B1 Xii =
P
n1:::nN ; p1:::pN ; q1:::qN :
ni 6= 0;
PN
k=1 pk 6= 0
piPN
k=1 pk
(n1:::nN ; p1:::pN ; q1:::qN ):
B2 Xji =
P
n1:::nN ; p1:::pN ; q1:::qN :
ni = 0;PN
k=1 pk 6= 0;
PN
h=1 nh 6= 0
nj
NX
k=1;k 6=i
nk
pi
NX
k=1
pk
(n1:::nN ; p1:::pN ; q1:::qN ); i 6= j:
C Xji =
P
n1:::nN ; p1:::pN ; q1:::qN :PN
k=1 nk 6= 0;
PN
k=1 pk 6= 0
wgtijnjPN
k=1 wgtiknk
piPN
k=1 pk
(n1:::nN ; p1:::pN ; q1:::qN ):
Table 4: Different policies: generating functions
A Xji =
R 1
0
R 1
0
h
@
@uj
@
@vi
g(u1:::uN ; v1:::vN ; w1:::wN )
i
u1:::un = x
v1:::vn = y
w1:::wN = 1
dx dy:
B1
Xii =
R 1
0
h
@
@vi

g(u1:::uN ; v1:::vN ; w1:::wN )+
 g(u1::uj 1; 0; uj+1::uN ; v1:::vN ; w1:::wN )
i
u1:::un = x
v1:::vn = y
w1:::wN = 1
dx dy:
B2 Xji =
R 1
0
R 1
0
h
@
@uj
@
@vi
g(u1::uj 1; 0; uj+1::uN ; v1:::vN ; w1:::wN )
i
u1:::un = x
v1:::vn = y
w1:::wN = 1
dx dy:
C Xji =
R 1
0
R 1
0
h
@
@u^j
@
@vi
[g(u1:::uN ; v1:::vN ; w1:::wN )] uk = u^wgtik
i
u1:::uN = x
v1:::vN = y
w1:::wN = 1
dx dy:
Table 5: Different policies: final expressions
A Xji =
jsj
A
isi
B
[1  G(1 A)  G(1 B) + G(1 A B)]
B Xji =
(
isi
A jsj
jsj
B
[G(1  jsj)  G(1 A)  G(1 B   jsj) + G(1 A B)] j 6= i
jsj
B
[1  G(1  jsj)  G(1 B)  G(1 B   jsj)] j = i
C Xji = isiB
R 1
0
jsjwgtijx
wgtij 1
h
G0(1 A+PNk=1 kskxwgtik)  G0(1 A B +PNk=1 kskxwgtik)i dx
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6. Considering more resources
To create a more realistic scenario we suppose that each peer holds more than one
resource type. We denote withNmax the maximum number of resource types available
in the whole system. Each one is characterized by a popularity level that describes the
probability that a peer has such a resource. As stated in [12] the popularity of the
resources follows a Zipf Mandelbrot [20] distribution. The resource distribution is
characterized by three parameters: qZ , sZ and nZ(i). The first two parameters define
the Zipf Mandelbrot distribution and they are constant for the whole system, whereas
nZ(i) represents the mean number of resources per peer, and we allow it to depend on
the autonomous system i. In particular, let us define fi(k) with 1  k  NMax as the
probability that a peer in the i  th AS holds resource k, computed as:
fi(k) =
nZ(i) H
(k + qZ)sZ
(32)
with
H =
1
NMaxX
l=1
1
(l + qZ)sZ
It is easy to show that with (32) and the above definition we have
PNMax
l=1 fi(l) =
nZ(i). Note that since fi(k) is a probability distribution the following constraints must
hold:
nZ(i)  (1 + qZ)
sZ
H
:
In a scenario with NMax > 1 resources we compute equations (29), (30) and (31)
for any k-th resource type. We introduce the notation mi (k) to study the evolution of
the k  th resources in the i  th AS at stepm. The function reported in (32) is used to
determine the initial values of mi (k), 
m
i (k) and 
m
i (k) by equations (33), (34), and
(35) respectively:
0i (k) = fi(k)i (33)
0i (k) = fi(k)(1  i) (34)
0i (k) = 1  fi(k) (35)
where i is the factor that splits the resource from owned () to searched (1 ) for
the i-th AS. The evolution of ,  and  is successively computed from (18), (20) and
(21) for any i-th AS and k-th resource.
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7. Model validation
The whole model that accounts for system dynamics, searching policies that drive
traffic crossing the ASs, and more than one resource type, is validated using PeerSim
[14]. It is a discrete event simulator providing a collection of features that help the
implementation and analysis of network protocols or multi-agent simulations. Here
we present a comparison between the model and the simulation for the weighted case
(Section 5.3) with the P2P overlay distributed over three ASs as shown in Figure 4.
Note that, the uniform strategy can be considered a special case where all weights are
equal.
In the simulated scenario the whole peer population is grouped into ASs of different
sizes. The number of resource types in the system is fixed to NMax = 10. Each
peer can be interested in a resource according to the resource popularity. Resource’s
popularity is modeled according to the Zipf-Mandelbrot [20] discrete distribution as
explained in Section 6.
Each peer of the system has two lists: one for owned resources and one for re-
sources in which is interested. The elements of both lists are assigned randomly during
the initialization by using Algorithm 7.1.
Algorithm 7.1: RESOURCEASSIGNEMENTS(AS;Resource)
for each ASi 2 AS
do
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
for each peerj 2 ASi
do
8>>>>><>>>>>:
owned ;
interest ;
for each resr 2 Resource
do
8>><>>:
if (rnd < ZIPF (resr; ASi))
do
8><>:
if (rnd < i)
do owned owned [ resr
else
do interest interest [ resr
The function rnd generates a random number uniformly distributed between 0 and
1 and ZIPF is a function that computes equation (32).
The duration of simulation is subdivided into rounds, and each round into time
slots. A round has exactly a number of time slots equal to the number of peers active in
the overlay. In this way all peers are scheduled exactly once for one simulation round.
When scheduled, a peer makes a request to another for a specific resource contained in
its interest list.
The search is made according to the chosen policy. In our simulation each peer
can use both the uniform and the weighted strategy explained in Section 5. When a
peer j belonging to an ASi finds a resource r in a peer k in ASl then the number
of transfers from ASl to ASi is increased. At the end of the round the resource r is
removed from the interest list of peer j and it is added to owned list with probability
1  i (see Section 4.1). The peer hides the resource (i.e., it is not added to owned list)
with probability i to model the freeloader behavior.
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Table 6: Simulation parameters
Description Value
ntot 5000
n1; n2; n3 2500, 1800, 700
NMax 10
sZ ; qZ 1, 1
1; 2; 3 0.5, 0.2, 0.7
nZ(1); nZ(2); nZ(3) 2.5, 2.5, 2.5
7.1. Results and Parameters Sensitivity
The simulation parameters are indicated in Table 6. The network is composed of
3 ASs with a total number of peers (ntot) equal to 5000 distributed as follow: 2500
in AS1, 1800 in AS2, and 700 in AS3. The number of resource types (NMax) spread
in the system is equal to 10. sZ and qZ are respectively the skewness factor and the
plateau factor of the Zipf-Mandelbrot distribution. For any resource type we have that
AS1 has the same number of holders and searchers (1 = 0:5), AS2 has a higher
number of searchers (1 = 0:2), whereas AS3 has a higher number of holders (1 =
0:7). All the ASs share the same nZ value, that is 2:5, that is the mean number of
resources per peer.
We assign the following weight matrixWGT :
WGT =
24 4 2 11 2 1
1 2 4
35
where element wgtij corresponds to the weight that the ASi assign to ASj . Ac-
cording to this setting of WGT , each peer seeks the needed resources with higher
probability in its same AS, and prefers shorter paths to longer ones when communicat-
ing with other ASs.
In Figures 5, 6 and 7 we show the comparison between the evolution over time of
model and simulator. The simulator outcomes are the mean of 100 runs and the 95%
confidence interval is reported. As we can see the model outcomes are always included
in the 95% confidence interval of simulation results. Further confirmation of previous
results comes from Figure 8 where we compared the final steady state of simulation
and model.
Figure 5 reports the data related to transfers fromAS1: internal traffic is the highest
since wgt11 = 4 and the AS1 has a large number of peers sharing the resources (n1 =
2500 and 1 = 0:5. The traffic due to AS3 requests is low for two reasons: most of
AS3 peers hold the resources (3 = 0:7), and wgt33 > wgt32 > wgt31 > making
most of AS3 requests seek first internal resources and then the ones of AS2. Also in
AS2 most of the traffic from AS2 (Figure 6) is internal whereas the traffic directed to
the others is marginal, since AS1 and AS3 have a larger number of resources. The
traffic coming from AS3 (Figure 7) is mostly addressed to AS2 that requires many
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resources (2 = 0:2), and is less routed forward AS1 that assigns to AS3 the lowest
weight (wgt13 = 1).
8. Experiments
In this section, we conduct several experiments using both the P2P resource dif-
fusion model (Sections 4, 5, and 6) and the AS-level network model (Section 3). In
particular, the aim of this section is to present how the proposed results can be used
to study the costs that different ASs can achieve using different resource location pro-
tocols and different parameter settings in the P2P application. We compute costs and
rewards for ASs in a complex network topology taking into account peering and transit
accords, non trivial routes and different ASs sizes. Note that, once the model is de-
veloped, the ISPs could exploit this approach by tuning the parameters with accurate
settings according to their knowledge and information availability.
In Figure 2 is depicted the topology used for experiments. The network is com-
posed of eight different ASs, and nodes are connected with links characterized by
peering or transit agreements. In the system there are N = 10 different resources
types.
8.1. Changing AS sizes
We study the impact of changing the size of ASs. Different sizes are computed
according to Zipf-Mandelbrot distribution with parameters N = [1 : : : 8] with step 1,
s = [0 : : : 1:4] with a step of 0:2, and q = 2. Figure 9 shows how network sizes
change. When s = 0 all the ASs have the same number of nodes, while moving on
higher value of the s parameter the distribution becomes more skewed. First we use
the uniform strategies for resources finding. If we set the cost usage to 1 for all links
representing transit agreements from ASi to ASj( ij = 1), the rewards (Figure 10)
and the costs (Figure 11) can be computed for each AS. It is interesting to use such
information to compute the net profit, that is the difference between rewards and costs
(shown in Figure 12), and to study how the profit changes as a function of the different
AS size. We observe that in this particular topology AS1, AS2, and AS7 only pay for
transit access or have peering agreements, so their net profit is negative. For AS1 and
AS2 the costs diminish when the value of the parameter s increases due to the reduced
peer population. Instead for AS7 the population increases with the value of s, so the
transit fee it pays to AS8 has a greater impact on its profit. AS8 always increases its
profit, taking advantage both from its position in the topology (i.e. since it has only
peer agreements), and from the fact that it has the largest population that becomes even
wider when the distribution is more skewed. Note that forAS5 there is a trend inversion
when s = 0:6. We can conclude that the more skewed peer distribution has a positive
effect on AS from 1 to 3 (the one with a smaller population) and 8 (the one with the
largest population), whereas is negative for 4 to 7 (the one with an average population).
8.2. Changing weights of the links
We use the weighted strategy to increase the weights on peering links. This exper-
iment shows how the proposed methodology can be exploited to study the impact on
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costs and rewards among different ASs of an appropriate applicative routing protocol.
In particular, we assigned wgtij = 1 for transit agreements and wgtij = 1 + offset
for local search (i = j) and peer agreements to increase the priority towards less ex-
pensive routes. Again we set the cost usage ij = 1 for transit agreements from ASi
to ASj . The total profit for each AS, when all ASs increase weights to their peering
links, is illustrated in Figure 13 with offset varying from 0 to 1:2. The absolute value
of the fees paid in the overall system globally decreases. AS1, AS2, and AS3 pay less
than using the uniform strategy (offset = 0) and AS8 has a lower profit.
We then study the effects that changes in the routing strategy of a single AS can
cause to the entire system. Figure 14 shows the results when only AS7 increases the
routing weights on its peering links. As we can see, the changed policy of AS7 affects
the overall system. Results are obtained by changing the weights (of AS7 peering
links) by setting offsets from 0 to 6. Indeed for increasing value of wgt the total
rewards of AS7 increase, while the gains of AS5, AS6 and AS8 diminish. AS1, AS2,
AS3 and AS4 benefit from the new policy of AS7, that uses less their transit links
preferring its peering partners.
8.3. Changing costs of the links
In this experiment we change the cost for the links connected to AS8, i.e. i8 for
each i 2 (4; 5; 6), the value ranges from i8 = 1:1 to i8 = 1:4. The results are shown
in Figure 15. Higher costs affect only the directly connected ASs. An increment of
cost in the transit to AS8 increases as expected the revenue of this AS at the expense
of its neighbors. It is interesting however noting that other ASs in the system are not
affected by this cost increase.
8.4. Changing AS agreements
Finally we consider changes to the agreements among ASs. The results are reported
in Figure 16. We denote with M1 the topology used in previous experiments and
depicted in Figure 2 and with M2 the one shown in Figure 3 obtained by changing
the agreements in the following way: the links between AS1 and AS4, and from AS2
to AS4 have now a peering agreement; from AS5 to AS7 a transit agreement is settled
whereAS5 is the customer. A similar connection is set up betweenAS7 andAS6, with
AS7 as customer. We illustrated results in Figure 16, considering the weighted strategy
with two different weights, wgtij = 1 and wgtij = 10. In this case if we increase the
weights to peering ASs we obtain a gain for all the networks. Also in this topology
AS1, AS2, and AS3 do not benefit from transit agreements, but AS4 and AS5 have
now a positive profit because they do not route requests ofAS2. It is interesting to note
that in the considered case the reduction of the number of transit agreements is more
convenient (despite the reduction in profits) since the effect of reducing the expenses is
predominant.
9. Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a simple technique to study the economy relations,
in terms of costs and revenues, among different ASs. The real effects of peering agree-
ments depends on the traffic exchanged among the different ASs: a model of such
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traffic is thus required to better understand the effects of the considered agreements.
We have thus presented a detailed model of the traffic generated by a simple P2P file
sharing protocol.
The aim of this work is to provide a tool to help administrators in determining the
right costs in commercial agreements, and to tune the system parameters to increase
the profits and reduce the expenses system-wide. The case study proposed in this paper
considers different resource location policies, and in particular the impact of being able
to locate requested resources in the same AS has been emphasized.
The main limitations of this approach lies in the difficulty to get the required global
information, since ASs are administrated by different entities. However, we showed
a way to study the impact of parameters characterizing the application on the global
topology. Future research directions should address techniques able to retrieve the
required information and to automatically tune the applications.
Both the AS cost and reward determination model, and the P2P models, can be
extended and used in different contexts. The former can be used to study the peering
agreements among ASs under the traffic generated by different type of applications,
and the latter can be exploited to study other effects of the traffic generated among
peers in a more general overlay network.
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Figure 1: Example topology of six ASs with the cost and reward matrices for AS2
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Figure 2: AS topologyM1 used for experiments
Figure 3: AS topologyM2 used for experiments
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Figure 4: AS topology used to validate the model
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Figure 5: Comparison between the model and the simulation for transfers from AS1
to others
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Figure 6: Comparison between the model and the simulation for transfers from AS2
to others
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Figure 7: Comparison between the model and the simulation for transfers from AS3
to others
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Figure 9: Different configuration of AS sizes
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Figure 10: Reward distribution considering several configuration of AS sizes
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Figure 11: Cost distribution considering several configuration of AS sizes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12 x 10
4
AS ID
Ne
t p
ro
t
 (re
wa
rds
 − 
co
sts
)
 
 
s = 0.2
s = 0.4
s = 0.6
s = 0.8
s = 1.0
s = 1.2
s = 1.4
Figure 12: Distribution of the difference reward-cost (net profit) considering several
configuration of AS sizes
Figure 13: Distribution of the difference reward-cost (net profit) when all ASs increase
weights to their peering links
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Figure 14: Distribution of the difference of the net profit respect to wgt = 0 when
only AS7 increases weights to its peering links
Figure 15: Net profit when only AS8 increases its transit costs
Figure 16: Comparison between two different topologies
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